The 
INTRODUCTION
With the Progression in various mobile and wireless networks, including universal mobile telecommunication systems, wireless local area networks, roadside-to-vehicle communication systems [1] , and satellite networks, ubiquitous computing becomes a reality. Users can access network services anywhere and anytime. However, within the heterogeneous networks, ensuring the secure and efficient roaming service is still difficult [4] , [5] , because different networks have different security policies and authentication protocols. Subsequently, any secure roaming scheme committed for only one type of network technology cannot fulfill the security needs from the heterogeneous networks.
In heterogeneous networks, user privacy preservation has become an important and challenging issue in the roaming service, and has been widely considered by researchers. In most existing secure roaming schemes, the privacy preservation only equates with anonymity, i.e., hiding users' identities. However, this may not be suitable for diverse privacy needs in real world [6] , [7] - [9] .
Moreover, there may be a large number of mobile users that need to be revoked in the network anytime due to various reasons, e.g., when any illegal or exceptional events occur. However, the existing secure roaming schemes [9] , [10] do not support this function. This will significantly increase the burden of the home authentication server and potentially reduce the efficiency of the whole network. Therefore, efficient user revocation for dynamic membership in the secure roaming services is important. The General roaming scenario for wireless networks for communication is shown in Fig. 1 . It involves three parties: a roaming user U, a visited foreign server V, and a home server H of which U is a subscriber. Normally, V and H have a roaming agreement, So U can access its subscribed services through V when U is in a foreign network administered by V. Before U can access resources provided by V, an appropriate authentication process between U and V must be carried out. This process is of great importance. 
RELATED WORK
The existing roaming schemes for secure communication can mainly be classified into three categories: symmetriccryptosystem-based (SCbased), asymmetric-cryptosystembased (AC-based), and hybrid schemes. The SC-based secure roaming schemes,such as EAP-based authentication and key agreement protocols [26] , [27] , are designed based on standard protocols [28] , [29] . SC-based schemes are mostly accepted because they are compatible with standard protocols. However, they require the interaction between the foreign server and the home server, which may lead to the single point of failure [30] , and induce large authentication transmission overhead because of the long distance between the foreign server and the home server. Jiang and Shi [31] , [32] propose several mutual authentication and key exchange schemes for roaming services. In [31] and [32] , public key cryptography such as digital signature and Diffie-Hellman key exchange, is adopted on the basis of SC-based Schemes, which can further enhance the security of roaming Service. The limitations of SC-based schemes have greatly stimulated the research of AC-based schemes [9] , [10] , [20] , [33] , because AC-based schemes can provide more security, stronger privacy preservation, and require fewer communication rounds. These advantages have led to the recent increasing popularity of the AC-based secure roaming schemes. One of the important security properties in the AC-based secure roaming schemes is strong user anonymity, which includes user anonymity and user untraceablility. They point that a privacy-preserving and user authentication scheme should satisfy the following requirements for communication in the roaming network: server authentication, subscription validation, provision of user revocation function, key establishment, user anonymity, and untraceablility. However, the existing privacypreserving authentication schemes for roaming service used for communication cannot provide anonymous user linkability that makes the authorized entities, e.g., FN operators or service providers; have the ability to anonymously link the access information from the user for statistical purposes. This may not be enough for diverse applications in the roaming service.
CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS OF SECURE ROAMING SERVICES
Many security and efficiency challenges exist in roaming services, mainly due to the resource constraints of mobile users, the authentication delay constraint, and the demanding security requirements of roaming applications. A. 
RESISTANCE AGAINST DOS ATTACKS
To prevent the DoS attack, in roaming network for communication have suggested that the message-specific puzzles of [18] can be Incorporated into current roaming authentication protocols (e.g., [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] ) in the following way. When a foreign server finds no evidence of the attack (e.g., the arrival rate of bogus access requests is less than a predefined threshold), it Processes access requests normally (i.e., indiscriminately). However, when it suspects itself of being attacked, it only performs expensive verification on access requests selectively. In particular, the server attaches a unique puzzle into the beacon messages and requires the solution of the puzzle to be attached to each access request message. The server commits resources to process an access request only when the solution is correct.
In general, solving a puzzle requires a brute force search in the solution space, while solution verification is very fast. Additionally, puzzles are deployed in conjunction with conventional time-outs on server resources. Thus, in order to create an interruption in services, an adversary must have abundant resources to be able to promptly compute a large enough number of puzzle solutions in line with its sending rate of illegal access requests. In contrast, although puzzles slightly increase legitimate users' computational load when the server is under attack, they are still able to Obtain network access regardless of the existence of the attack.
CPAL:-DESIGN GOALS
Design goal to develop a CPAL (Conditional PrivacyPreserving Authentication Mechanism) for roaming service is as follows. A. Strong Anonymous Access Authentication: First, the proposed scheme should provide strong anonymous access authentication. Specifically, it requires that authentication messages, which are interacted by the MS and the VAS, have not been altered during the transmission, i.e., if the adversary A forges and/or modifies the authentication messages, the malicious operations should be detected. Meanwhile, the identity of the MS cannot be revealed to adversary A or the VAS. Efficient User Revocation for Dynamic Membership: Due to some reasons (e.g., the subscription period of a user has expired or a user's secret key has been compromised), an efficient user revocation function should be proposed, especially for dynamic membership. That means the user revocation function can revoke a group of users simultaneously, which makes the whole scheme more flexible and efficient. Meanwhile, CPAL can provide a universal secure roaming service. That means the proposed CPAL and its signaling flows can be used in any roaming scenario regardless of the type of networks that the MS is visiting. Moreover, the proposed CPAL scheme should meet all security requirements in previous schemes.
CONCLUSION
Roaming services in wireless networks provide people with attractive flexibility and convenience for communication. A set of mechanisms to complement existing work for defending against DoS attacks, efficient authentication, flexible roaming in mobile contexts is describe here. CPALCondition Privacy Preserving Authentication with Access Linkability resists various security threats and provides more flexible and elaborate privacy preservation including user tracking, anonymous user linking, joining, and revocation function for dynamic membership.
